CAS-005 Exam Dumps - CompTIA SecurityX Certification Exam

Best practice in CAS-005 network security design is to deploy:

NIDS passively via a port mirror (SPAN port) to avoid introducing latency or failure points.

NIPS inline in a strategic point, such as integrated with the main firewall, to actively block threats.This combination provides both visibility and active protection without overloading network paths.

SecurityX CAS-005 secure DevOps guidance recommends integrating security controls into the CI/CD pipeline. By validating container security baselines at security gates before deployment, noncompliant builds are stopped early, ensuring consistency across environments.

Option B is useful but does not ensure compliance if changes are made after image creation.

Option A detects drift but only after deployment.

Option D is reactive and does not prevent insecure deployments.

In a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) model, the data owner or an assigned stakeholder has the authority to determine who can access resources. SecurityX CAS-005 IAM objectives describe DAC as user- or owner-controlled, where permissions can be granted or revoked at the owner’s discretion.

In this scenario, because permissions from the legacy system could not be migrated, multiple stakeholders were made responsible for assigning and managing access—matching the DAC model’s characteristics.

Option A relates to outsourcing, which does not define an access control model.

Option C is about authentication limitations, unrelated to the choice of DAC.

Option D describes backup responsibilities, which are operational tasks, not access control.

Geofencingallows the device to be restricted based on its physical location — disabling or locking devices when they move outside of trusted zones.Full disk encryptionensures that if a device is lost, the data remains inaccessible to unauthorized users. Containerization protects specific apps or data, but does not disable the entire device. Patch management, allow/blocklists, and geotagging serve other important functions but are not directly linked to the requirements in this scenario.

The best solution to reduce the likelihood of firmware-level attacks and rootkits is to implement measured boot. Measured boot is a hardware-assisted security mechanism that leverages Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and Secure Boot processes. It records cryptographic measurements of each stage of the boot process—from firmware to operating system loaders—and stores them in the TPM. Security software, such as attestation services, can then verify that the system booted into a known, trusted state. If firmware or boot-level code has been tampered with, the measurements will not match expected values, alerting administrators to compromise.

Option A (software integrity checks) validates application-level integrity but does not address firmware rootkits that load before the operating system. Option B (self-encrypting drives) protects data at rest but does not prevent rootkits. Option D (host-based encryption) ensures confidentiality but does not detect or mitigate firmware-level persistence.

Measured boot specifically targets low-level tampering, making it the most relevant control to defend against rootkits and firmware exploits.