CAS-005 Exam Dumps - CompTIA SecurityX Certification Exam

Based on the provided authentication logs, we observe that User1's accountexperienced multiple failed login attempts within a very short time span (at 8:01:23 AM on 12/15). This pattern indicates a potential brute-force attack or an attempt to gain unauthorized access. Here’s a breakdown of why disabling User1's account is the appropriate first step:

Failed Login Attempts: The logs show that User1 had four consecutive failed login attempts:

VM01 at 8:01:23 AM

VM08 at 8:01:23 AM

VM01 at 8:01:23 AM

VM08 at 8:01:23 AM

Security Protocols and Best Practices: According to CompTIA Security+ guidelines, multiple failed login attempts within a short timeframe should trigger an immediate response to prevent further potential unauthorized access attempts. This typically involves temporarily disabling the account to stop ongoing brute-force attacks.

Account Lockout Policy: Implementing an account lockout policy is a standard practice to thwart brute-force attacks. Disabling User1's account will align with these best practices and prevent further failed attempts, which might lead to successful unauthorized access if not addressed.

B. Pre-commit code linting: Linting tools analyze code for syntax errors andadherence to coding standards before the code is committed to the repository. This helps catch minor code issues early in the development process, reducing the likelihood of deployment failures.

D. Automated regression testing: Automated regression tests ensure that new code changes do not introduce bugs or regressions into the existing codebase. By running these tests automatically during the deployment process, developers can catch issues early and ensure the stability of the development environment.

Other options:

A. Software composition analysis: This helps identify vulnerabilities in third-party components but does not directly address code quality or deployment failures.

C. Repository branch protection: While this can help manage the code submission process, it does not directly prevent deployment failures caused by code issues or security check failures.

E. Code submit authorization workflow: This manages who can submit code but does not address the quality of the code being submitted.

F. Pipeline compliance scanning: This checks for compliance with security policies but does not address syntax or regression issues.

The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) v3.1 uses three metric groups to calculate overall scores:Base,Temporal, andEnvironmental.

Base (E):Mandatory metrics assessing exploitability (e.g., attack vector) and impact (confidentiality, integrity, availability).

Temporal (A):Optional metrics reflecting the current state of the vulnerability (e.g., exploit availability, remediation level).

Environmental (F):Optional metrics tailoring the score to the organization’s context (e.g., security requirements).

B, C, D (Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality):These are subcomponents of the Base Impact metrics, not standalone groups.

G (Impact):A categorywithin Base, not a group.

H (Attack vector):A single Base metric, not a group.

To enable code signing with an existing PKI, the first step is to configure the Certificate Authority (CA) to issue code signing certificates. Adding a new template with attributes specific to code signing (e.g., key usage for signing) allows the CA to support this requirement without disrupting existing operations.

Option A:Correct—templates define certificate types; this isthe foundational step.

Option B:Wildcard certificates are for domains, not code signing.

Option C:Recalculating root CA keys is unnecessary and risky unless compromised.

Option D:SAN (Subject Alternative Name) is for multi-domain certificates, irrelevant here.

Code-signing within theCI/CD pipelineensures that only verified and signed code is deployed, mitigating the risk of supply chain attacks. Updating Python withaptitudeand updating modules withpipensures vulnerabilities are patched. Deploying the solution to production after testing maintains application availability while securing the development lifecycle.

Branch protection (B)applies only to version-controlled environments, which is not the case here.

NFS network share (C)does not address the deprecated Python vulnerability.

Version designation (D)does not eliminate security risks from outdated dependencies.

Geofencingallows the device to be restricted based on its physical location — disabling or locking devices when they move outside of trusted zones.Full disk encryptionensures that if a device is lost, the data remains inaccessible to unauthorized users. Containerization protects specific apps or data, but does not disable the entire device. Patch management, allow/blocklists, and geotagging serve other important functions but are not directly linked to the requirements in this scenario.

Addressing misconfigurations and vulnerabilities in third-party hardware requires a comprehensive approach to manage risks throughout the supply chain. Implementing a propersupply chain risk management (SCRM) program is the most effective solution as it encompasses the following:

Holistic Approach: SCRM considers the entire lifecycle ofthe product, from initial design through to delivery and deployment. This ensures that risks are identified and managed at every stage.

Vendor Management: It includes thorough vetting of suppliers and ongoing assessments of their security practices, which can identify and mitigate vulnerabilities early.

Regular Audits and Assessments: A robust SCRM program involves regular audits and assessments, both internally and with suppliers, to ensure compliance with security standards and best practices.

Collaboration and Communication: Ensures that there is effective communication and collaboration between the company and its suppliers, leading to faster identification and resolution of issues.

Other options, while beneficial, do not provide the same comprehensive risk management:

A. Performing vulnerability tests on each device delivered by the providers: While useful, this is reactive and only addresses issues after they have been delivered.

B. Performing regular red-team exercises on the vendor production line: This can identify vulnerabilities but is not as comprehensive as a full SCRM program.

C. Implementing a monitoring process for the integration between the application and the vendor appliance: This is important but only covers the integration phase, not the entire supply chain.

A centralized Software Bill of Materials (SBoM) is the best solution for identifying vulnerabilities in container images in aprivate repository. An SBoM provides a comprehensive inventory of all components, dependencies, and their versions within a container image, facilitating quick evaluation and response to vulnerabilities.

Why Centralized SBoM?

Comprehensive Inventory: An SBoM lists all software components, including their versions and dependencies, allowing for thorough vulnerability assessments.

Quick Identification: Centralizing SBoM data enables rapid identification of affected containers when a vulnerability is disclosed.

Automation: SBoMs can be integrated into automated tools for continuous monitoring and alerting of vulnerabilities.

Regulatory Compliance: Helps in meeting compliance requirements by providing a clear and auditable record of all software components used.

Other options, while useful, do not provide the same level of comprehensive and efficient vulnerability management:

A. SAST scan reports: Focuses on static analysis of code but may not cover all components in container images.

C. CIS benchmark compliance reports: Ensures compliance with security benchmarks but does not provide detailed component inventory.

D. Credentialed vulnerability scan: Useful for in-depth scans but may not be as efficient for quick vulnerability evaluation.