CAS-005 Exam Dumps - CompTIA SecurityX Certification Exam

The code function provided in the question seems tobe designed to parse JSON formatted logs to check for an alarm state. Option A is a JSON format that matches the structure likely expected by the code. The presence of the "error_log" and "InAlarmState" keys suggests that this is the correct input format.

Microsegmentation is a critical strategy within Zero Trust architecture that enhances context-aware access systems by dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments. This reduces the attack surface and limits lateral movement of attackers within the network. It ensures that even if one segment is compromised, the attacker cannot easily access other segments. This granular approach to network security is essential for enforcing strict access controls and monitoring within Zero Trust environments.

Understanding the Security Event:

Unauthorized usersgained access from non-production to production.

IAM policies were weak, allowingbulk user creation.

Vulnerability assessments were disabled, andpatching was delayed.

Logs were unavailable, making incident response difficult.

Why Options A, D, and E areCorrect:

A (Disable bulk user creation by IAM team)→ Prevents unauthorized mass user account creation, which could beexploited by attackers.

D (Routine updates for endpoints & network devices)→ Patch management ensuresvulnerabilities are not left open for attackers.

E (Ensure all security/network devices send logs to SIEM)→ Helps withreal-time monitoring and detection of unauthorized activities.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

B (180-day log retention)→ While log retention is good,real-time monitoring is the priority.

C (Review application allow list daily)→ Reviewing itdaily is impractical. Regular audits are better.

F (Restrict production-to-non-production traffic)→ The issue isunauthorized access, not traffic routing.

The best solution is to provide a hash of all data made available (D). Hashing ensures the integrity of the threat intelligence data provided to customers. Clients can verify that the data received via API matches the published hash, ensuring no tampering occurred in transit or at rest. This supports customer trust and aligns with the objective of protecting data integrity while maintaining availability.

Option A (API secret keys) improves authentication and reduces attack surface but does not address integrity or compute efficiency. Option B (publishing IoCs publicly) increases attack surface and reduces control over distribution, which conflicts with security objectives. Option C (rate limiting) helps availability and cost control but does not guarantee data integrity.

By providing hashes, the company ensures customers can validate authenticity regardless of delivery method, reducing the risk of manipulated IoCs. This approach also minimizes compute spend since hashing is lightweight compared to continuous verification processes.

Therefore, the strongest alignment with all stated objectives—availability, reduced spend, reduced attack surface, and integrity—is achieved by providing hashes of all threat intelligence data.

The question states that security scanning and quality assurance (QA) in the CI/CD pipeline have been completed with no issues, indicating that the code in the test branch is ready for production. According to the CompTIA SecurityX CAS-005 study guide (Domain 2: Security Operations, 2.3), in a secure CI/CD pipeline, once code passes automated security scans, QA, and other checks (e.g., unit testing, peer reviews), the next step is to merge the tested branch into the main branch for deployment to production.

Option B:Threat modeling is typically performed earlier, during design or development, not after passing CI/CD checks.

Option C:Unit testing is part of the CI/CD pipeline and should already be completed.

Option D:Peer reviews are conducted before or during the test phase, not after QAand security scans are clear.

Option A:Merging the test branch to the main branch is the logical next step to prepare for production deployment.

Step-by-Step Explanation:

Both samples share similar function names, variable naming styles, and logic flow, indicating that they were likely written by the same developer. This is a keyobservation in malware attribution, as cyber threat analysts often look for unique coding styles to link malware to specific threat actors.

The presence of C2 (Command and Control) communication in both samples supports this theory, as attackers often reuse parts of their own malware code across different attacks.

In reviewing email headers and determining actions to mitigate phishing attempts, the security analyst should focus on patterns of suspicious behavior and the reputation of the sending domains. Here’s the analysis of the options provided:

A. Block messages from hr-saas.com because it is not a recognized domain: Blocking a domain solely because it is not recognized can lead to legitimate emails being missed. Recognition alone should not be the criterion for blocking.

B. Reroute all messages with unusual security warning notices to the IT administrator: While rerouting suspicious messages can be a good practice, it is not specific to the domain sending repeated suspicious messages.

C. Quarantine all messages with sales-mail.com in the email header: Quarantining messages based on the presence of a specific domain in the email header can be too broad and may capture legitimate emails.

D. Block vendor com for repeated attempts to send suspicious messages: This option is the most appropriate because it targets a domain that has shown a pattern of sending suspicious messages. Blocking a domain that repeatedly sends phishing attempts without previous communications helps in preventing future attempts from the same source and aligns with the goal of mitigating phishing risks.

The attacker gained domain control by collecting the KRBTGT hash (used for Kerberos tickets). Let’s evaluate:

A. Deleting SQLSV:Irrelevant since pass-the-hash failed there.

B. Reimaging ADMIN01S:Addresses the compromised host but not domain control.

C. Rotating KRBTGT password:Invalidates stolen Kerberos tickets, mitigating domain control per CAS-005’s focus on identity security.