CISM Exam Dumps - Certified Information Security Manager

The first step when developing a business case for a new intrusion detection system (IDS) solution is to define the issues to be addressed. A business case is a document that provides the rationale and justification for initiating a project or investment. It typically includes information such as the problem statement, the objectives, the alternatives, the costs and benefits, the risks and assumptions, and the expected outcomes. The first step in developing a business case is to define the issues to be addressed, which means identifying and describing the current situation, the problems or challenges faced by the organization, and the needs or opportunities for improvement. By defining the issues to be addressed, the information security manager can establish the scope and purpose of the business case, and provide a clear and compelling problem statement that explains why a new IDS solution is needed. The other options are not the first step when developing a business case for a new IDS solution, although they may be part of the subsequent steps. Performing a cost-benefit analysis is a step that involves comparing the costs and benefits of different alternatives, including the new IDS solution and the status quo. A cost-benefit analysis can help evaluate and justify the feasibility and desirability of each alternative, and support the decision-making process. Calculating the total cost of ownership (TCO) is a step that involves estimating the direct and indirect costs associated with acquiring, operating, maintaining, and disposing of an asset or a system over its entire life cycle. A TCO calculation can help determine the long-term financial implications of investing in a new IDS solution, and compare it with other alternatives. Conducting a feasibility study is a step that involves assessing the technical, operational, legal, and economic aspects of implementing a project or an investment. A feasibility study can help identify and mitigate any potential issues or risks that may affect the success of the project or investment, and provide recommendations for improvement

The most important measure of a security investment’s success is whether it delivers the anticipated risk reduction (D). CISM emphasizes that security investments are justified primarily by their ability to lower risk to within acceptable tolerance, not by compliance or financial return alone. Internal requirements (A) and standards compliance (B) are important but do not guarantee risk reduction. Financial benefits (C) are often indirect in security. Post-implementation reviews should validate whether the original risk assumptions were correct and whether residual risk aligns with management expectations.

The correct answer is D because the recovery phase focuses on restoring affected IT services, systems, and operations after containment and eradication have been completed. The objective is to return services to an operational state in a controlled manner while ensuring that the threat has been removed and systems are stable. Recovering business operation support is related to the broader business continuity goal, but the recovery phase of incident management is primarily concerned with restoring IT services and affected environments. Performing a lessons-learned review usually occurs after recovery, during post-incident review or improvement activities. Documenting restoration actions is important for evidence, accountability, and future analysis, but documentation is not the primary objective of recovery. In CISM incident management, recovery includes restoring systems, validating functionality, monitoring for recurrence, and returning operations to normal. Therefore, the primary objective of the recovery phase is to bring IT services back online safely and effectively.

Initiating incident response is the best course of action after a server has been attacked because it activates the incident response plan or process, which defines the roles and responsibilities, procedures and protocols, tools and techniques for responding to and managing a security incident effectively and efficiently. Reviewing vulnerability assessment is not a good course of action because it does not address the current attack or its impact, but rather evaluates the potential weaknesses or exposures of the server. Conducting a security audit is not a good course of action because it does not address the current attack or its impact, but rather verifies and validates the compliance or performance of the server’s security controls or systems. Isolating the system is not a good course of action because it does not address the current attack or its impact, but rather stops or limits any communication or interaction with the server. References: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-5/incident-response-lessons- learned https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2018/volume-3/incident-response-lessons-learned

 The primary objective of the information security incident response process is to minimize the negative impact to critical operations. An information security incident is an event that threatens or compromises the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information assets or processes. The information security incident response process is a process that defines the roles, responsibilities, procedures, and tools for detecting, analyzing, containing, eradicating, recovering, and learning from information security incidents. The main goal of the information security incident response process is to restore the normal operations as quickly and effectively as possible, and to prevent or reduce the harm or loss caused by the incident to the organization, its stakeholders, or its environment.

Conducting incident triage (A) is an important activity of the information security incident response process, but not the primary objective. Incident triage is the process of prioritizing and assigning the incidents based on their severity, urgency, and impact. Incident triage helps to allocate the appropriate resources, personnel, and time to handle the incidents, and to escalate the incidents to the relevant authorities or parties if needed. However, incident triage is not the ultimate goal of the information security incident response process, but a means to achieve it.

Communicating with internal and external parties (B) is also an important activity of the information security incident response process, but not the primary objective. Communicating with internal and external parties is the process of informing and updating the stakeholders, such as management, employees, customers, partners, regulators, or media, about the incident status, actions, and outcomes. Communicating with internal and external parties helps to maintain the trust, confidence, and reputation of the organization, and to comply with the legal and contractual obligations, such as notification or reporting requirements. However, communicating with internal and external parties is not the ultimate goal of the information security incident response process, but a means to achieve it.

Classifying incidents (D) is also an important activity of the information security incident response process, but not the primary objective. Classifying incidents is the process of categorizing and labeling the incidents based on their type, source, cause, or impact. Classifying incidents helps to identify and understand the nature and scope of the incidents, and to apply the appropriate response procedures and controls. However, classifying incidents is not the ultimate goal of the information security incident response process, but a means to achieve it.

References = CISM Review Manual, 16th Edition, Chapter 4: Information Security Incident Management, Section: Incident Response Plan, page 1811

The organization’s risk tolerance is the most important factor to consider when choosing a shared alternate location for computing facilities, as it determines the acceptable level of risk exposure and the required recovery time objective (RTO) for the organization. A shared alternate location is a facility that is used by multiple organizations for disaster recovery purposes, and it may have limited resources, availability, and security. Therefore, the organization must assess its risk tolerance and ensure that the shared alternate location can meet its recovery requirements and protect its information assets.

References = CISM Review Manual, 27th Edition, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2, page 2291; CISM Online Review Course, Module 4, Lesson 3, Topic 22; BCMpedia, Alternate Site3