312-50v13 Exam Dumps - Certified Ethical Hacker Exam (CEHv13)

CEH v13 emphasizes that advanced injection attacks often evade input validation through encoding and obfuscation. A Web Application Firewall (WAF) with evasion detection can analyze request patterns, payload behavior, and anomalies in real time.

Code reviews are important but reactive. SIEM correlates logs after attacks. 2FA does not prevent injection.

Thus, Option B provides the most effective immediate protection.

This scenario demonstrates a classic case of Session Fixation, a session hijacking technique explicitly covered under the CEH v13 Web Application Hacking module. Session fixation occurs when an attacker sets or predicts a valid session identifier and forces a victim to authenticate using that same session ID.

In the given question, two critical vulnerabilities are highlighted:

The session ID is embedded in the URL

The application does not regenerate the session ID after login

According to CEH v13, secure applications must regenerate session identifiers after successful authentication to prevent fixation attacks. If this does not occur, an attacker can craft a URL containing a known session ID and trick the victim into clicking it. Once the victim logs in, the attacker reuses the same session ID to gain unauthorized access.

CEH documentation states that session fixation is particularly effective when:

Session IDs are passed via URL parameters

Sessions persist across authentication

Secure cookie attributes are not enforced

Other options are incorrect because:

XSS-based cookie theft requires client-side script injection.

DNS cache poisoning is unrelated to session management.

CSRF exploits user trust but does not directly hijack sessions.

Thus, Session Fixation by pre-setting the token in a URL is the most effective attack in this case.

The scenario describes an on-device, app-based rooting approach that does not rely on a PC connection, USB debugging, or a bootloader unlock workflow. In CEH mobile platform coverage, this aligns with “one-click” rooting tools that package exploits to elevate privileges directly from user space to root on the device. These tools typically target known vulnerabilities in the Android OS, vendor kernels, or system services to obtain root privileges and then install a management component to maintain elevated access.

KingoRoot is commonly cited in ethical hacking training contexts as a popular one-click rooting solution that can run as an Android application and attempt to root a device without a computer, depending on the device model, Android version, and patch level. This directly matches the prompt: Sofia installs a mobile application, it “exploits a system vulnerability,” and it achieves root “without requiring a PC.” The constraints given, USB debugging disabled and OEM unlock restrictions, make PC-assisted ADB workflows or bootloader-based rooting less feasible, which further supports an exploit-driven, on-device rooting tool.

Magisk Manager is primarily a root management and systemless modification framework and typically assumes the device is already rooted or that the user can patch the boot image and flash it, often requiring bootloader unlock steps that OEM restrictions would block. “One Click Root” is a generic label rather than a specific tool in many CEH-style question banks. RootMaster is another one-click tool, but KingoRoot is the most widely recognized and frequently referenced for direct APK-based rooting in this context.

An HTTP GET POST attack is the most likely answer because the key indicator in the scenario is the measurement unit and behavior: 398 million requests per second. In CEH-aligned DoS and DDoS coverage, volumetric network-layer attacks like SYN floods are typically discussed in packets per second or bits per second, and they primarily exhaust connection tables or bandwidth at Layer 3 and Layer 4. By contrast, an HTTP flood targets Layer 7 and is commonly measured in requests per second because the attacker is sending large volumes of seemingly valid web requests. This overwhelms web servers, application stacks, and upstream components such as reverse proxies, load balancers, and API gateways, leading to degraded performance and dropped sessions, exactly as described when “active connections drop unexpectedly.”

The mention of “customer-facing platforms” and “numerous compromised devices” also matches typical botnet-driven application-layer flooding, where many distributed sources generate massive HTTP request rates to evade simple IP-based blocking. A TCP SACK panic attack is a vulnerability-triggered crash condition related to TCP handling, not a request-rate spike scenario. An RST attack involves sending TCP reset packets to tear down sessions, which would not normally present as an extreme requests-per-second event in server logs.

Therefore, the evidence most strongly supports an application-layer DDoS: an HTTP GET POST flood designed to exhaust server and application resources and cause intermittent service disruption.

Side jacking, as defined in CEH v13 Web Application Hacking, is a form of session hijacking where an attacker captures valid session identifiers—usually cookies—by sniffing network traffic. This attack is particularly effective when applications fail to encrypt session cookies using HTTPS.

In CEH v13, side jacking is commonly associated with attacks performed on unsecured wireless networks, where attackers passively monitor traffic using packet sniffers such as Wireshark. If session cookies are transmitted in plaintext, the attacker can replay them to impersonate the victim without needing login credentials.

Option B precisely matches this definition: capturing unencrypted session cookies and reusing them to gain unauthorized access.

Other options describe different attack types:

A is credential harvesting via social engineering.

C is network exploitation.

D is cross-site scripting (XSS).

CEH v13 emphasizes enforcing HTTPS, Secure and HttpOnly cookie flags, and session regeneration as defenses against side jacking.

CEH v13 identifies Idle (Zombie) Scanning as one of the most stealthy reconnaissance techniques. In this method, attackers use a third-party system (the zombie) to send probes to the target, obscuring the attacker’s true identity.

Because the attacker never directly interacts with the target, detection and attribution become extremely difficult. FIN and Xmas scans are stealthy but still originate from the attacker’s IP. TCP connect scans are noisy and easily detected.

CEH v13 highlights idle scanning as the gold standard for stealth reconnaissance, making option D correct.

According to the CEH Denial-of-Service (DoS/DDoS) module, application-layer DDoS attacks specifically target services such as HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, or APIs by sending requests that appear legitimate but overwhelm server resources.

An HTTP flood attack sends a massive number of HTTP GET or POST requests, consuming CPU, memory, and application threads. CEH highlights that these attacks are particularly dangerous because they:

Mimic normal user behavior

Are difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic

Bypass traditional network-layer defenses

Option A is correct.

Options B, C, and D operate primarily at the network or transport layers, not the application layer.

CEH stresses that HTTP floods are among the most challenging DDoS attacks to mitigate due to their stealthy nature.