CIC Exam Dumps - CBIC Certified Infection Control Exam

The scenario describes a potential outbreak of multidrug-resistant Enterococcus faecium in an extended-care facility (ECF) wing, indicated by four positive cultures (including the current case and three prior cases from urine and a draining wound) within a month. The organism exhibits resistance to ampicillin, vancomycin, and penicillin, but sensitivity to linezolid, suggesting a possible vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) strain, which is a significant concern in healthcare settings. The Certification Board of Infection Control and Epidemiology (CBIC) emphasizes the importance of rapid outbreak detection and response in the "Surveillance and Epidemiologic Investigation" domain, aligning with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for managing multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs).

Option A, "Notify the medical director of the outbreak," is the most immediate and critical action. Identifying an outbreak—defined by the CDC as two or more cases of a similar illness linked by time and place—requires prompt notification to the facility’s leadership (e.g., medical director) to initiate a coordinated response. The presence of four Enterococcus cases, including a multidrug-resistant strain, within a single ECF wing over a month suggests a potential cluster, necessitating urgent action to assess the scope, implement control measures, and allocate resources. The CDC’s "Management of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms in Healthcare Settings" (2006) recommends immediate reporting to facility leadership as the first step to activate an outbreak investigation team, making this the priority.

Option B, "Compare the four culture reports and sensitivity patterns," is an important subsequent step in outbreak investigation. Analyzing the antibiotic susceptibility profiles and culture sources can confirm whether the cases are epidemiologically linked (e.g., clonal spread of VRE) and guide treatment and control strategies. However, this is a detailed analysis that follows initial notification and should not delay alerting the medical director. Option C, "Conduct surveillance cultures for this organism in all residents," is a proactive measure to determine the prevalence of Enterococcus faecium, especially VRE, within the wing. The CDC recommends targeted surveillance during outbreaks, but this requires prior authorization and planning by the outbreak team, making it a secondary action after notification. Option D, "Notify the nursing administrator to close the wing to new admissions," may be a control measure to prevent further spread, as suggested by the CDC for MDRO outbreaks. However, closing a unit is a significant decision that should be guided by the medical director and infection control team after assessing the situation, not an immediate independent action by the IP.

The CBIC Practice Analysis (2022) and CDC guidelines prioritize rapid communication with leadership to initiate a structured outbreak response, including resource allocation and policy adjustments. Given the multidrug-resistant nature and cluster pattern, notifying the medical director (Option A) is the most immediate and appropriate action to ensure a comprehensive response.

Themost effective way to assess emergency preparednessfor an influx of patients withviral hemorrhagic fever (VHF)is throughtabletop exercises or full-scale drills. These exercises simulate real-life scenarios, allowing hospitals totest protocols, identify weaknesses, and improve response efforts.

Why the Other Options Are Incorrect?

A. Meet frequently with emergency management professionals– Whileimportant, meetings alonedo not provide hands-on testingof preparedness.

B. Conduct regular rounding in the Emergency Department– Rounding helps withpolicy compliance, butdoes not test the entire emergency response plan.

D. Collaborate to assess the availability of supplies and PPE– This isone componentof preparedness butdoes not evaluate the facility’s response in real-time.

CBIC Infection Control Reference

APIC recommendsfull-scale emergency drillsas thegold standard for assessing preparedness for emerging infectious diseases​.

Anyevidence of moistureinside a sterilization package indicates acompromised sterilization process. The immediate action is torecall and reprocessthe entire affected load.

According toANSI/AAMI ST79and cited in theAPIC Text:

“Any items with packaging that appears to be wet should not be used.” These items must bereprocessedto ensure sterility is not compromised.

This is not a matter for education or monitoring—it requires direct corrective action to protect patient safety.

Postoperative infections in clean surgical operations, defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as uninfected operative wounds with no inflammation and no entry into sterile tracts (e.g., gastrointestinal or respiratory systems), are influenced by various perioperative factors. The Certification Board of Infection Control and Epidemiology (CBIC) emphasizes identifying and mitigating risk factors in the "Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases" domain, aligning with CDC guidelines for surgical site infection (SSI) prevention. The question focuses on identifying a procedure not documented as a contributor to SSIs, requiring an evaluation of evidence-based risk factors.

Option C, "The use of iodophors for preoperative scrubs," has not been documented to contribute to the development of postoperative infections in clean surgical operations. Iodophors, such as povidone-iodine, are antiseptic agents used for preoperative skin preparation and surgical hand scrubs. The CDC’s "Guideline for Prevention of Surgical Site Infections" (1999) and its 2017 update endorse iodophors as an effective method for reducing microbial load on the skin, with no evidence suggesting they increase SSI risk when used appropriately. Studies, including those cited by the CDC, show that iodophors are comparable to chlorhexidine in efficacy for preoperative antisepsis, and their use is a standard, safe practice rather than a risk factor.

Option A, "Prolonged preoperative hospital stay," is a well-documented risk factor. Extended hospital stays prior to surgery increase exposure to healthcare-associated pathogens, raising the likelihood of colonization and subsequent SSI, as noted in CDC and surgical literature (e.g., Mangram et al., 1999). Option B, "Prolonged length of the operations," is also a recognized contributor. Longer surgical durations are associated with increased exposure time, potential breaches in sterile technique, and higher infection rates, supported by CDC data showing a correlation between operative time and SSI risk. Option D, "Shaving the site on the day prior to surgery," has been documented as a risk factor. Preoperative shaving, especially with razors, can cause microabrasions that serve as entry points for bacteria, increasing SSI rates. The CDCrecommends avoiding shaving or using clippers immediately before surgery to minimize this risk, with evidence from studies like those in the 1999 guideline showing higher infection rates with preoperative shaving.

The CBIC Practice Analysis (2022) and CDC guidelines focus on evidence-based practices, and the lack of documentation linking iodophor use to increased SSIs—coupled with its role as a preventive measure—makes Option C the correct answer. The other options are supported by extensive research as contributors to SSI development in clean surgeries.

The scenario involves a needlestick injury sustained by a phlebotomist during the resuscitation of a patient diagnosed with Neisseria meningitidis infection, characterized by a petechial rash, meningitis, and cardiac arrest. Neisseria meningitidis is a gram-negative diplococcus that can cause meningococcal disease, including meningitis and septicemia, and is transmitted through direct contact with respiratory secretions or, in rare cases, blood exposure. The exposure management for the phlebotomist must align with infection control guidelines, such as those from the Certification Board of Infection Control and Epidemiology (CBIC) and the CDC, to prevent potential infection. Let’s evaluate each option:

A. Prophylactic rifampin plus isoniazid: Prophylactic antibiotics are recommended for close contacts of individuals with meningococcal disease to prevent secondary cases. Rifampin is a standard prophylactic agent for Neisseria meningitidis exposure, typically administered as a 2-day course (e.g., 600 mg every 12 hours for adults). Isoniazid, however, is used for tuberculosis (TB) prophylaxis and is not indicated for meningococcal disease. Combining rifampin with isoniazid is incorrect, as it reflects a confusion with TB management rather than meningococcal exposure. This option is not appropriate.

B. A tuberculin skin test now and in ten weeks: A tuberculin skin test (TST) or interferon-gamma release assay (IGRA) is used to screen for latent tuberculosis infection, with a follow-up test at 8-10 weeks to detect conversion after potential TB exposure. Neisseria meningitidis is not related to TB, and a needlestick injury from a meningococcal patient does not warrant TB testing. This option is irrelevant to the scenario and not the correct exposure management.

C. Work furlough from day ten to day 21 after exposure: Neisseria meningitidis has an incubation period of 2-10 days, with a maximum of about 14 days in rare cases. The CDC and WHO recommend that healthcare workers exposed to meningococcal disease via needlestick or mucosal exposure be monitored for signs of infection (e.g., fever, rash) and, if symptomatic, isolated and treated. Additionally, a work restriction or furlough from day 10 to day 21 after exposure is advised to cover the potential incubation period, especially if prophylaxis is declined or contraindicated. This allows time to observe for symptoms and prevents transmission to vulnerable patients. This is a standard infection control measure and the most appropriate initial management step pending prophylaxis decision.

D. A review of the phlebotomist’s hepatitis B vaccine status: Reviewing hepatitis B vaccine status is a critical step following a needlestick injury, as hepatitis B can be transmitted through blood exposure. However, this applies to bloodborne pathogens (e.g., HBV, HCV, HIV) and is not specific to Neisseria meningitidis, which is primarily a respiratory or mucosal pathogen. While hepatitis B management (e.g., post-exposure prophylaxis with hepatitis B immunoglobulin or vaccine booster) should be addressed as part of a comprehensive needlestick protocol, it is not the first or most relevant priority for meningococcal exposure.

The best answer is C, as the work furlough from day 10 to day 21 after exposure addresses the specific risk of meningococcal disease following a needlestick injury. This aligns with CBIC’s focus on timely intervention and work restriction to prevent transmission in healthcare settings. Prophylactic antibiotics (e.g., rifampin) should also be considered, but the question asks for the exposure management, and furlough is a primary control measure. Hepatitis B and TBconsiderations are secondary and managed separately.

The correct answer is C, "Ambulance personnel should be evaluated for possible exposure," as this statement is true regarding the need for evaluating exposure to communicable illness. According to the Certification Board of Infection Control and Epidemiology (CBIC) guidelines, the presence of Gram negative diplococci in a cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) specimen is suggestive of a serious bacterial infection, most likely Neisseria meningitidis, which causes meningococcal disease. This condition is highly contagious and can be transmitted through respiratory droplets or direct contact with respiratory secretions, particularly during procedures like intubation (CBIC Practice Analysis, 2022, Domain I: Identification of Infectious Disease Processes, Competency 1.1 - Identify infectious disease processes). The patient was intubated during ambulance transport, creating a potential aerosol-generating procedure (AGP) that could have exposed ambulance personnel to infectious droplets before Droplet Precautions were instituted upon arrival at the Emergency Department (ED). Therefore, evaluating ambulance personnel for possible exposure is necessary to assess their risk and determine if post-exposure prophylaxis (e.g., antibiotics) or monitoring is required.

Option A (follow-up evaluation is not required for this laboratory finding) is incorrect because the identification of Gram negative diplococci in CSF is a critical finding that warrants investigation due to the potential for meningococcal disease, a reportable and transmissible condition. Option B (ED personnel should be evaluated for possible exposure) is less applicable since the patient was immediately placed in Droplet Precautions upon ED admission, minimizing exposure risk to ED staff after that point, though it could be considered if exposure occurred before precautions were fully implemented. Option D (follow-up evaluation is not necessary as the appropriate precautions were promptly instituted) is inaccurate because the prompt institution of Droplet Precautions in the ED does not retroactively address the exposure risk during ambulance transport, where precautions were not in place.

The focus on evaluating ambulance personnel aligns with CBIC’s emphasis on identifying and mitigating transmission risks associated with communicable diseases, particularly in high-risk settings like ambulance transport (CBIC Practice Analysis, 2022, Domain III: Infection Prevention and Control, Competency 3.2 - Implement measures to prevent transmission of infectious agents). This step is supported by CDC guidelines, which recommend exposure evaluation and prophylaxis for close contacts of meningococcal disease cases (CDC Meningococcal Disease Management, 2021).

The infection preventionist (IP) should start by comparingSSI ratesbetween theacute-care operating roomand thestand-alone surgery center. This direct comparison will help determine if there is a statistically significant difference in infection rates and guide further investigation.

Step-by-Step Justification:

Identify Trends:

Compare SSI ratesbetween the two locationsover a set period to identify patterns​.

Assess Contributing Factors:

Look at factors such aspatient population, antibiotic prophylaxis, surgical techniques, environmental controls, and adherence to infection prevention protocols​.

Validate Surveillance Data:

Ensure thatconsistent SSI surveillance methodologiesare used at both locations to avoid discrepancies​.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

A. Initiate prospective surveillance for SSIs in hysterectomies performed at the stand-alone surgery center:

Prospective surveillance is beneficial butdoes not immediately answer the surgeon’s concernabout existing infections.

B. Compare the most recent post-hysterectomy SSI surveillance data from the surgery center with those of the previous 12 months:

This approach only looks at trends at thesurgery centerwithout comparing it to theacute-care setting.

C. Initiate post-hysterectomy SSI surveillance in hysterectomy patients to verify accuracy of current surveillance methodology:

This step is secondary. Before initiatingnew surveillance, a direct comparison should be made using existing data.

CBIC Infection Control References:

APIC Text, "Surgical Site Infection Surveillance and Prevention Measures"​.

HIV post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) should be initiated within 2 hours to be most effective​.

Waiting for results (B) delays critical treatment.

PEP should always be offered after high-risk exposure, not only if symptoms develop (C).

Retesting after 6 months (D) is recommended but should not delay PEP initiation.

CBIC Infection Control References:

APIC Text, "Bloodborne Pathogens and PEP," Chapter 11​.