DOP-C02 Exam Dumps - AWS Certified DevOps Engineer - Professional

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation From Exact Extract of DevOps Engineer Documents Only:

AWS X-Ray provides distributed tracing for microservice-based applications. Deploying the X-Ray daemon as a DaemonSet in the EKS cluster and instrumenting the application with the X-Ray SDK enables end-to-end tracing across microservices, helping identify performance bottlenecks. This method is documented in “Using AWS X-Ray with Amazon EKS” (AWS Observability Guide).

The company requires an organization-wide, centralized, and automated solution to detect sensitive data in Amazon S3, aggregate findings in one location, and quarantine affected objects with minimal operational overhead. AWS provides a native service specifically designed for this purpose: Amazon Macie.

Option A is essential because Amazon Macie automatically discovers and classifies sensitive data such as PII in S3 buckets using managed machine learning models. When enabled at the organization level, Macie scans buckets across all accounts and Regions. Integrating Macie with AWS Security Hub centralizes all findings in a single dashboard, allowing the company’s security officer to review and manage sensitive data alerts across the organization without building custom aggregation pipelines.

Detection alone is not sufficient; remediation is also required. Option C completes the solution by using Amazon EventBridge, which natively receives Macie findings in near real time. An EventBridge rule can trigger a Lambda function whenever Macie identifies sensitive data. The Lambda function can then copy the affected object to a quarantine S3 bucket and delete the original object, meeting the remediation requirement automatically and consistently.

Option D requires custom sensitive data detection logic, which is complex, error-prone, and unnecessary given Macie’s capabilities. Option E is invalid because SCPs cannot inspect or move data. Option B does not detect sensitive information.

Therefore, A and C together provide the most efficient, scalable, and AWS-recommended solution.

The problem is that the DevOps engineer cannot assume the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role in the new member account that joined AnyCompany’s management account through an Organizations invitation. The solution is to create a new IAM role with the same name and trust policy in the new member account.

Option A is incorrect, as it does not address the root cause of the error. The DevOps engineer’s IAM user already has permission to assume the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role in any member account, as this is the default role name that AWS Organizations creates when a new account joins an organization. The error occurs because the new member account does not have this role, as it was not created by AWS Organizations.

Option B is incorrect, as it does not address the root cause of the error. An SCP is a policy that defines the maximum permissions for account members of an organization or organizational unit (OU). An SCP does not grant permissions to IAM users or roles, but rather limits the permissions that identity-based policies or resource-based policies grant to them. An SCP also does not affect how IAM roles are assumed by other principals.

Option C is correct, as it addresses the root cause of the error. By creating a new IAM role with the same name and trust policy as the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role in the new member account, the DevOps engineer can assume this role and access the account. The new role should have the AdministratorAccess AWS managed policy attached, which grants full access to all AWS resources in the account. The trust policy should allow the management account to assume the role, which can be done by specifying the management account ID as a principal in the policy statement.

Option D is incorrect, as it assumes that the new member account already has the OrganizationAccountAccessRole IAM role, which is not true. The new member account does not have this role, as it was not created by AWS Organizations. Editing the trust policy of a non-existent role will not solve the problem.

The most operationally efficient solution is to use AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store1 to store the AMI ID and reference it in the launch template2. This way, the launch template does not need to be updated every time a new AMI is created by Image Builder. Instead, the Image Builder pipeline can update the Parameter Store value with the newest AMI ID3, and the Auto Scaling group can launch instances using the latest value from Parameter Store.

The other solutions require updating the launch template or creating a new version of it every time a new AMI is created, which adds complexity and overhead. Additionally, using EventBridge rules and Lambda functions or Run Command documents introduces additional dependencies and potential points of failure.

 1: AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store 2: Using AWS Systems Manager parameters instead of AMI IDs in launch templates 3: Update an SSM parameter with Image Builder