AAISM Exam Dumps - ISACA Advanced in AI Security Management (AAISM) Exam

The AAISM materials classify availability attacks as attempts to disrupt or degrade the functioning of an AI system so that its outputs become unreliable or unusable. In this scenario, the fraudulent social media accounts are deliberately overwhelming the AI tool with misleading negative reviews, undermining its ability to deliver accurate sentiment analysis. This aligns directly with the concept of an availability attack. Model inversion relates to reconstructing training data from outputs, deepfakes involve synthetic content generation, and data poisoning corrupts the training set rather than manipulating inputs at runtime. Therefore, the fraudulent review campaign is most accurately identified as an availability attack.

AAISM frameworks highlight output-based controls, including output filtering, restriction validation, and policy-aligned guardrails as primary defenses for AI agents with high privileges. Ensuring the agent does not output unauthorized instructions or sensitive data directly mitigates misuse.

Allowing user configuration (B) increases risk. Prohibiting manipulation entirely (C) is impractical. Reducing human oversight (D) increases system abuse potential.

AAISM guidance states that when adopting AI, the most important step is to conduct a risk assessment and update the enterprise risk register. This ensures AI-specific risks are identified, documented, and integrated into the organization’s existing governance structures. Benchmarking peers provides context but does not address internal risk. Implementing methodologies and frameworks are important, but they precede or follow the assessment process. The decisive step that connects adoption to enterprise risk governance is updating the risk register with AI-specific risks.

AAISM defines an AI BCP as requiring validated failover and recovery testing of AI components, including:

• model hosting environments

• model-serving APIs

• feature stores

• inference pipelines

Only Option B tests actual continuity of AI functionality.

Monitoring (A) detects issues but does not ensure continuity. Access controls (C) relate to security, not continuity. Backup detail (D) is insufficient without recovery testing.

To prevent prompt/interface injection, AAISM prioritizes preventive technical controls at the boundary: input validation/sanitization, structured templates/system prompts, allow/deny lists, and context isolation. These measures constrain user-supplied content and block adversarial instructions from being interpreted as system directives. Monitoring (A) and audits (D) are detective/assurance activities; manual output review (B) is compensating but less scalable and does not prevent injection.

AAISM classifies model inversion as a privacy leakage threat where adversaries infer sensitive attributes or training records from model outputs. The recommended technical risk treatments emphasize reducing overfitting and information leakage via regularization and output-side constraints. Regularization (e.g., stronger penalties, output smoothing, confidence calibration, temperature limiting, and related techniques) reduces the model’s tendency to memorize training data and curtails exploitable signal in outputs.

• A (adversarial training) targets perturbation robustness, not primary for inversion.

• B (reducing complexity) can help but is a coarse control with limited assurance versus explicit anti-leakage regularization.

• D (more iterations) typically increases overfitting and leakage risk.

AAISM further notes that privacy-preserving training and output minimization are preferred where feasible; among the listed options, regularization most directly addresses inversion risk.

AAISM materials identify human-in-the-loop governance as the most effective safeguard against risks such as hallucinations in AI systems used in high-stakes domains like healthcare. By ensuring that human experts validate outputs before they influence patient treatment decisions, organizations preserve accountability, safety, and accuracy. Penetration testing is a cybersecurity measure, not relevant to hallucination risk. AI impact analysis helps evaluate systemic effects but does not directly prevent faulty outputs. Data validation improves input quality but cannot fully prevent generative hallucinations. The key safeguard is human-in-the-loop oversight.

AAISM highlights that AI-enabled predictive maintenance improves operational resilience by using real-time sensor monitoring to schedule repairs based on actual conditions rather than fixed schedules. This prevents unexpected breakdowns, reduces downtime, and ensures continuity of operations. Regular maintenance based on recommendations is static and may not reflect real conditions. Manual reviews are slow and inefficient. Full automation of repairs without human oversight is not realistic or safe in critical manufacturing. The approach that best demonstrates resilience is real-time condition-based repair scheduling.