312-50v13 Exam Dumps - Certified Ethical Hacker Exam (CEHv13)

According to CEH v13 Network Scanning and Enumeration, ICMP Echo Requests (ping) are commonly filtered by firewalls and intrusion prevention systems to reduce network reconnaissance exposure. When ICMP Echo Replies are not returned but other services remain operational, the most likely explanation is ICMP filtering rather than host unavailability or compromise.

CEH v13 explicitly states that many organizations configure firewalls to block ICMP Echo Requests while allowing other ICMP types or higher-layer protocols. This practice helps prevent attackers from easily mapping live hosts during the reconnaissance phase.

The other options are incorrect because:

Unused IPs would not necessarily have active services.

A breach would typically present additional symptoms.

Network congestion would affect multiple protocols, not just ICMP.

Thus, blocked ICMP is the correct interpretation.

CEH v13 defines a white hat hacker as a security professional with explicit authorization to perform penetration testing, vulnerability assessments, and exploitation attempts within legal and contractual boundaries. Their objective is to strengthen security, not compromise it. White hats follow structured methodologies, document findings, and provide remediation recommendations. A black hat (Option A) acts maliciously and without permission. A grey hat (Option B) operates without authorization but without harmful intent, which is not compliant with corporate penetration testing procedures. Script kiddies (Option C) rely on pre-built tools without deep knowledge and are not employed for legitimate engagements. Therefore, the individual described is a white hat, operating under legal and ethical guidelines with organizational consent.

The correct answer is D, Long-term access. In MITRE ATT & CK terminology, “Persistence” refers to techniques adversaries use to keep access to a compromised environment after the initial compromise. This aligns closely with CEH system-hacking methodology, where the equivalent phase is “Maintaining Access.” CEH material describes maintaining access as the phase where a hacker tries to retain ownership of a system after exploiting a vulnerability, often by securing continued access through backdoors, rootkits, Trojans, or Trojan horse backdoors. Another CEH-focused source explains that after privilege escalation, the attacker moves into maintaining access by setting up mechanisms that allow return access later, which directly matches the concept of long-term access. Initial exploit belongs to gaining access, data theft relates more to collection or exfiltration, and cleanup relates to covering tracks. Therefore, ATT & CK “Persistence” means maintaining long-term access to the target environment.

According to the Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH) attack methodology, once reconnaissance, footprinting, and website mirroring have been completed, the attacker proceeds cautiously to exploitation while maintaining stealth. CEH documentation emphasizes that low-noise, application-layer attacks are preferable when the objective is to minimize detection.

Option B, attempting SQL Injection, aligns directly with CEH’s Web Application Hacking module. SQL Injection is a server-side attack that can often be executed through normal-looking HTTP requests, making it less likely to trigger intrusion detection systems (IDS) or security alerts. CEH materials highlight SQL injection as a common and effective technique for extracting sensitive data such as usernames, passwords, and business-critical information without disrupting server operations.

Option A is incorrect because immediately modifying server configuration files after session hijacking significantly increases the risk of detection. CEH guidelines stress post-exploitation restraint, especially during red team operations.

Option C is not ideal at this stage because automated vulnerability scanners generate substantial traffic and are highly detectable. CEH explicitly notes that vulnerability scanning is noisy and often logged.

Option D is the least stealthy option. Brute-force attacks generate numerous failed authentication attempts, triggering security alerts and account lockouts. CEH classifies brute-force attacks as high-risk and easily detectable.

Therefore, SQL Injection represents the most effective and stealthy next step in accordance with CEH’s structured attack lifecycle.

The correct answer is A, No flags set. In CEH scanning concepts, a NULL scan is a TCP port-scanning technique in which the scanner sends a TCP segment with none of the TCP flags enabled. This means the packet does not contain SYN, ACK, FIN, RST, PSH, or URG flags. The uploaded CEH material states that when no TCP flag is set, the scan is known as Null Scanning, and further describes a NULL scan as sending a packet “without any flag set.” This differs from a SYN scan, which sends SYN packets to begin a half-open connection, and from an ACK scan, which sends packets with the ACK flag set to help identify filtering behavior. RST is not what a NULL scan sends; rather, a closed port may respond with RST. For exam purposes, remember: NULL scan equals empty TCP flag field, so the best answer is No flags set.

Fingerprinting the running service is the most appropriate technique because the strongest indicator in the scenario is inconsistent protocol behavior and error responses that do not match a legitimate production database service. In CEH reconnaissance guidance, honeypots and decoy systems often emulate common services but may implement only partial protocol stacks or simplified responses. This can lead to anomalies such as incorrect banner strings, malformed or generic error messages, unsupported command handling, unusual protocol negotiation, or responses that do not align with the claimed software version. By fingerprinting, Mia compares observed behavior against expected behavior for the genuine service, including version-specific quirks, command sets, response codes, and timing patterns for particular requests.

In practice, service fingerprinting involves interacting with the service using legitimate and edge-case requests, validating banners and headers, and correlating results with known signatures from real implementations. If the server claims to be a specific database or application service but reacts in ways that real deployments would not, it suggests emulation, instrumentation, or deception typical of honeypots designed to log attacker activity.

Analyzing response time can help, because some honeypots respond too quickly or with uniform timing, but timing alone is less definitive than protocol inconsistencies. MAC address analysis is not reliable for identifying honeypots and is often not visible beyond the local segment. Analyzing system configuration and metadata usually requires deeper access than reconnaissance and is not the primary method when the clue is protocol-level mismatch. Therefore, fingerprinting the running service best fits the observed symptoms.

QUBB ESTION NO: 25 [Mobile Platform and IoT Hacking]

Javier Ruiz from CyberFortress Solutions is tasked with auditing the mobile security practices of Apex Financial Services, a financial firm in Houston, Texas. During a covert penetration test, Javier targets employees ' personal smartphones used to access corporate financial systems. He exploits a vulnerability by installing a malicious app that bypasses access controls, granting him unauthorized entry to sensitive financial data because the devices lack a specific security measure to restrict app access. Based on this vulnerability, which BYOD security guideline is most likely missing in Apex Financial Services ' policy?

A. Review permissions requested by apps before installing them

B. Set passwords for apps to restrict others from accessing them

C. Enforce automatic device locking or implement biometric authentication

D. Use encryption mechanisms to store data

Answer: A

The most likely missing BYOD guideline is reviewing application permissions before installation. In CEH mobile security guidance, a major risk in BYOD environments is the introduction of untrusted or malicious applications that abuse the mobile permission model to access corporate data, intercept authentication tokens, read storage, capture keystrokes via accessibility services, or communicate externally. When users install apps without scrutinizing requested permissions, they may unknowingly grant excessive privileges that enable data theft or access-control bypass, especially if the app leverages OS weaknesses or misconfigurations.

The scenario states Javier “installs a malicious app that bypasses access controls” and gains access to sensitive financial data because devices “lack a specific security measure to restrict app access.” This maps directly to a policy gap around controlling and validating apps and their permission requests. CEH emphasizes that organizations should reduce attack surface by limiting app privileges, avoiding sideloading from untrusted sources, and enforcing least privilege through user awareness and enterprise controls such as MDM application allowlisting and permission governance. Reviewing permissions is the user-facing guideline that prevents employees from granting dangerous access (for example, SMS, storage, contacts, accessibility, device admin, or VPN configuration permissions) that can enable credential theft or unauthorized data access.

Option B adds an extra layer for local access but does not stop a malicious app with granted permissions from accessing corporate data. Option C helps if a device is physically stolen, but it does not prevent malicious apps already running under the user context. Option D protects data at rest, yet a malicious app can still exfiltrate data once it is decrypted and accessed by the user session. Therefore, permission review is the most directly relevant missing BYOD guideline.

The technique being used is Error Message Analysis, because the tester is intentionally supplying a special character payload and then interpreting the application’s returned database or SQL parsing error to infer the presence of an injection point. In CEH-aligned SQL injection methodology, one of the earliest indicators of SQL injection is when crafted input causes the application to generate a database error, such as syntax errors, unclosed quotation marks, type conversion failures, or context-related messages that reveal how the input is being embedded into a query. A long series of single quotes is a classic trigger: if user input is concatenated into a SQL statement without proper sanitization or parameterization, the quotes can break the query structure and force the database engine or ORM layer to throw an error that exposes the query context.

The scenario explicitly states the response is an error message indicating the application cannot handle the input “in the current SQL context.” That means the application is leaking information through error responses, which CEH highlights as both a detection opportunity for testers and a security weakness because detailed errors can guide attackers toward successful payload construction.

This is not primarily “Detecting SQL Modification,” which focuses on confirming changes in query logic or results, often using boolean-based techniques. It is not “Function Testing,” which validates application functions rather than probing input handling at the SQL layer. While the input resembles fuzzing, fuzz testing is broader and does not specifically depend on interpreting SQL error messages as the detection signal. Here, the decisive evidence is the SQL-context error returned, making Error Message Analysis the correct technique.