300-220 Exam Dumps - Conducting Threat Hunting and Defending using Cisco Technologies for Cybersecurity 300-220 CBRTHD

The correct answer isThey produce false positives and false negatives. Automated dynamic malware analysis tools, such as sandboxes, execute suspicious files in isolated environments to observe runtime behavior. While these tools are extremely valuable in modern SOCs, they are not infallible and have well-known limitations.

False positives occur when benign software exhibits behaviors that resemble malicious activity, such as creating registry keys, spawning child processes, or making network connections. Conversely, false negatives occur when malware intentionallyevades detectionby altering its behavior. Many modern malware samples include sandbox evasion techniques such as checking for virtualized environments, delaying execution, requiring user interaction, or disabling malicious functionality when analysis artifacts are detected.

Option A is incorrect because dynamic analysis can, in fact, uncover runtime vulnerabilities and exploit behavior. Option C is misleading; while tooling coverage varies, language support is not the primary limitation. Option D refers tomanual analysis, whereas the question explicitly addresses automated tools.

From a threat hunting and malware analysis standpoint, professionals understand that sandbox results must becorrelated with other telemetry, including endpoint behavior, network traffic, and threat intelligence. Automated tools are best used as part of a layered analysis strategy, not as a single source of truth.

This limitation reinforces a core security principle:automation accelerates detection, but human judgment validates impact. Skilled analysts interpret sandbox results, investigate anomalies, and determine real-world risk. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of dynamic analysis tools allows SOC teams to avoid overreliance on automation while still benefiting from its speed and scale.

The correct answer isconsistent attacker tradecraft mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. Attribution at a professional level relies onbehavioral consistency, not superficial artifacts.

Advanced threat actors routinely rotate infrastructure, recompile malware, and vary filenames specifically to defeat attribution efforts. As a result, indicators such as IP addresses, hashes, and timestamps are unreliable and sit low on thePyramid of Pain.

What attackers cannot easily change ishow they operate. This includes:

Initial access techniques

Credential harvesting methods

Lateral movement patterns

Persistence mechanisms

Command-and-control behaviors

When these behaviors remain consistent across incidents, they form abehavioral fingerprint. Mapping these observations toMITRE ATT&CK techniquesallows analysts to compare activity against known threat group profiles maintained by intelligence providers and national CERTs.

Option A and B are weak indicators easily altered by attackers. Option D provides almost no attribution value, as timing alone is coincidental and unreliable.

Professional attribution requires correlating TTPs across campaigns and validating them against historical threat actor intelligence. This method supports high-confidence attribution used in legal, executive, and geopolitical contexts.

Therefore,Option Cis the correct and defensible answer.

The correct answer isit reveals consistent attacker tradecraft across incidents. Attribution relies onbehavioral consistency, not on malware samples or exploits.

Avoiding malware and abusing legitimate tools (living-off-the-land techniques) reflects adeliberate operational strategy. These behaviors tend to remain consistent across campaigns and are frequently documented in threat intelligence profiles.

Options A and D are incorrect because no exploit or ransomware is involved. Option B is incorrect; living-off-the-land techniques are modern, not outdated.

Cisco-aligned threat hunting emphasizesMITRE ATT&CK mappingand behavioral analysis to support attribution efforts. This approach is far more reliable than artifact-based attribution.

Thus,Option Cis the correct answer.

The correct answer isinternal systems authenticating to multiple hosts using SMB in a short time. This behavior is a classic indicator ofcredential-based lateral movement.

When attackers obtain valid credentials, they often move laterally by:

Accessing administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$)

Using SMB, WMI, WinRM, or RDP

Authenticating to multiple systems rapidly

Cisco Secure Network Analytics excels at identifyingeast-west traffic anomalies, which are central to lateral movement detection. A single host authenticating to many internal systems over SMB in a short time deviates strongly from normal user behavior.

Option A relates to external traffic, not lateral movement. Option C may indicate command-and-control or staging but not lateral movement. Option D aligns more with beaconing behavior.

This technique aligns withMITRE ATT&CK – Lateral Movementand is explicitly covered in theCBRTHD blueprintunder network-based threat hunting.

Thus,Option Bis the correct answer.

The correct answer isUse Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to block malicious domains. The key detail in this scenario is that the endpoint is makingcontinuous outbound TCP connections to a known Command-and-Control (C2) server over port 80, which strongly indicates active malware beaconing or payload retrieval.

Deep Packet Inspection enables security controls—such as next-generation firewalls or network security analytics platforms—to inspectapplication-layer content, including HTTP headers, URLs, domains, and payload characteristics. This allows defenders to block C2 communicationbased on domain names, URL patterns, or behavioral signatures, even if attackers change IP addresses. Since C2 infrastructure is frequently rotated, IP-based blocking alone is insufficient for long-term mitigation.

Option A (browser extension deny list) may help prevent a specific initial infection vector, but it does not addresspost-compromise C2 traffic, especially if malware communicates independently of the browser. Option B (antivirus quarantine) is reactive and limited by signature coverage; modern malware often evades AV detection. Option D (IDS) can detect similar connections but typically does notblocktraffic unless integrated with an IPS or firewall, making it less effective for mitigation.

From a professional threat hunting and SOC standpoint, blocking C2 communication at thenetwork layer using DPIis a high-impact defensive control. It disrupts attacker command channels, prevents data exfiltration, and buys time for endpoint remediation and forensic investigation.

This aligns withMITRE ATT&CK – Command and Control (TA0011)mitigation strategies and reflects a mature security posture:detect at the endpoint, disrupt at the network. Therefore, optionCis the most effective action to mitigate similar connections in the future.