212-89 Exam Dumps - EC Council Certified Incident Handler (ECIH v3)

In Wireshark, the filtericmp.type==8is used to detect ping sweep attempts. ICMP type 8 messages are echo requests, which are used in ping operations to check the availability of a network device. A ping sweep involves sending ICMP echo requests to multiple addresses to discover active devices on a network. By filtering for ICMP type 8 messages in Wireshark, Bran can identify these echo requests, helping to pinpoint ping sweep activities on the network.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation (ECIH-aligned):

The ECIH Introduction to Incident Handling module identifies social engineering as a primary method attackers use to gain unauthorized access without exploiting technical vulnerabilities.

Option C is correct because the attack relied on deception—spoofed notifications and lookalike domains—to trick users into disclosing credentials. This is a classic social engineering technique, often used as the initial access vector.

Options A, B, and D are technical reconnaissance or network attacks, not human-focused deception.

Recognizing social engineering as the root cause is essential for selecting appropriate remediation actions such as user awareness training, phishing defenses, and MFA, all emphasized in ECIH guidance.

The Slowloris attack is a type of application-layer attack that targets the web server by establishing and maintaining many simultaneous HTTP connections to the target server. Unlike traditional network-layer DoS/DDoS attacks such as UDP flood or SYN flood, Slowloris is designed to hold as many connections to the target web server open for as long as possible. It does so by sending partial requests, which are never completed, and periodically sending subsequent HTTP headers to keep the connections open. This consumes the server's resources, leading to denial of service as legitimate users cannot establish connections. The Slowloris attack is effective even against servers with a high bandwidth because it targets the server's connection pool, not its network bandwidth.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation (ECIH-aligned):

This scenario demonstrates manual phishing email verification, which is a foundational detection technique taught in the ECIH Email Security module. Manual verification involves human inspection of email characteristics such as sender address anomalies, mismatched URLs, unusual tone, urgency, and contextual inconsistencies.

Option D is correct because Ethan manually inspects the email by hovering over links, reviewing sender formatting, and evaluating message tone. These actions are key indicators used to identify phishing without relying on automated tools.

Option A relates to encoding analysis, which is not described. Option B involves automated network-based detection. Option C focuses on shortened URLs, which are not present here.

ECIH emphasizes that while automated defenses are important, human verification remains critical, especially for targeted phishing attacks that bypass technical controls. Therefore, Option D correctly identifies the detection approach used.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation (ECIH-aligned):

This scenario represents a failure in the Preparation phase of the Incident Handling and Response (IH&R) lifecycle as defined by the EC-Council ECIH curriculum. Preparation focuses on establishing policies, procedures, standards, and awareness programs that define how systems and data must be used and protected. In this case, employees were sharing credentials via unauthorized channels because the organization failed to provide explicit rules governing acceptable communication practices.

Option C is correct because establishing defined protocols for approved digital channels directly addresses the root cause. ECIH emphasizes that organizations must define acceptable use policies, secure communication standards, and data handling procedures before incidents occur. These controls reduce the likelihood of human error and insider misuse by setting clear expectations and enforceable boundaries.

Option A relates to physical surveillance risks, which are unrelated to credential sharing. Option B is a recovery-focused control and does not prevent misuse. Option D is a detection mechanism that cannot compensate for missing governance controls.

By defining approved channels and educating users on their proper use, organizations significantly reduce the probability of credential leakage and insider-driven incidents, fulfilling a core ECIH preparation requirement.

The described attack is a "Watering hole" attack. This type of attack targets specific groups of users by infecting websites they are known to frequently visit. The attacker first identifies websites that are popular with the target group, then finds vulnerabilities in those websites to inject malicious code. When the victims visit the compromised site, the code redirects them to other sites or automatically downloads malware onto their machines. This attack leverages the trust users have in regularly visited sites to distribute malware. Unlike obfuscation application, directory traversal, or cookie/session poisoning attacks, watering hole attacks specifically aim to compromise a commonly used and trusted website to target its users.

Risk assumption involves accepting the potential risk and continuing to operate the IT system while implementing controls to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. This strategy acknowledges that some level of risk is inevitable and focuses on managing it through mitigation measures rather than eliminating it entirely. Risk avoidance would entail taking actions to avoid the risk entirely, risk planning involves preparing for potential risks, and risk transference shifts the risk to another party, typically through insurance or outsourcing. Risk assumption is a pragmatic approach that balances the need for operational continuity with the imperative of risk management.

Comprehensive and Detailed Explanation (ECIH-aligned):

This incident represents an application-layer DoS attack, which targets specific functions rather than bandwidth. ECIH emphasizes function-level protection in such scenarios.

Option C is correct because rate limiting restricts abusive request frequency while allowing legitimate usage. It directly addresses the exploited feature without disrupting service availability.

Option D may block legitimate users behind shared IPs. Options A and B do not mitigate the attack vector.

Rate limiting aligns with ECIH guidance for preserving availability during Layer 7 attacks.