ZDTE Exam Dumps - Zscaler Digital Transformation Engineer

Zscaler Identity (ZIdentity) supports modern, phishing-resistant passwordless authentication using the FIDO2 standard. FIDO2 combines Web Authentication (WebAuthn) and the Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP2) to enable users to authenticate with security keys or built-in platform authenticators (such as biometric sensors) without transmitting or storing a reusable password. The Digital Transformation Engineer documentation explains that when a user registers a FIDO2 authenticator with ZIdentity, the service stores a public key tied to that device and account. Future logins are validated using a cryptographic challenge–response, providing strong protection against credential theft and replay attacks.

By contrast, SAML (option B) and OIDC (option C) are federation protocols used for single sign-on (SSO) and identity delegation between an identity provider and service providers; they do not themselves define how passwordless authentication is performed. They can carry assertions from an IdP that might use FIDO2 behind the scenes, but SAML and OIDC are not the passwordless method. SCIM (option D) is a provisioning standard for creating, updating, and deprovisioning identities and groups, not an authentication protocol.

Therefore, the only option that directly represents the protocol enabling passwordless login to a ZIdentity account is FIDO2.

===========

Zscaler External Attack Surface Management (EASM) is focused on discovering and monitoring an organization’s internet-facing digital assets. In the Engineer curriculum, EASM is described as continuously identifying domains, subdomains, hostnames, IP addresses, TLS certificates, and cloud services that are exposed to the public internet. A key example used in the training is hostnames that “leak” internal context, such as environment names, projects, technologies, or business units. These hostnames are treated as digital entities because they represent externally reachable services and can give valuable clues to an attacker during reconnaissance.

By contrast, SSL inspection certificates installed on endpoints are internal controls and not part of the external attack surface. A Zscaler App Connector is designed to initiate only outbound connections and is intentionally not directly reachable from the internet, so its IP address is not an EASM discovery target. Likewise, lists of compromised usernames and passwords relate to threat intelligence and identity protection, not the mapping of exposed assets. Therefore, the only option that correctly matches the type of digital entity EASM is meant to identify is a service hostname that contains revealing information.

===========

In Zscaler Private Access, a provisioning key is a unique text string generated for an App Connector (or Private Service Edge) group and is used during enrollment to bind that connector to the correct group and PKI trust chain. The Zscaler Digital Transformation training material emphasizes that the provisioning key acts as the “identity anchor” for connectors in that group: it’s what the ZPA cloud uses to authenticate the connector at enrollment and associate it to the right configuration and policy context.

When that key is deleted, ZPA effectively invalidates the trust relationship for any connectors that were enrolled with it. In practice, these connectors are treated as revoked and must be removed and re-enrolled using a new provisioning key to restore a healthy, supportable state. The key is not archived for later reuse, and it does not automatically regenerate. Deletion is intentionally destructive so that, if a key is lost or suspected to be compromised, an administrator can immediately ensure that all connectors tied to that key are no longer trusted and must be re-provisioned, which aligns with zero trust and least-privilege principles.

===========

In ZPA, App Connectors are designed to be lightweight, horizontally scalable components. Their effective throughput and concurrent-connection capacity are often constrained more by network stack limitations (such as ephemeral port exhaustion and per-process file descriptor limits) than by raw CPU or memory. As a result, simply over-provisioning vCPUs and RAM to “hit” a target like 1 Gbps on a single connector usually does not provide linear performance gains.

Zscaler design guidance emphasizes deploying multiple App Connectors and allowing ZPA to intelligently load-balance traffic across them. This delivers resiliency and scales capacity while staying within realistic limits of TCP/UDP ports and OS-level descriptors. Over-scaling a single connector can lead to diminishing returns and may even create harder-to-diagnose issues when port ranges or file descriptors are saturated.

Storage is not the main factor in App Connector performance, and the platform does not recommend a “just throw more resources at it” approach. For these reasons, the correct answer is that port exhaustion and file descriptors, rather than memory or CPU, are typically the true limiting factors for App Connectors.

===========

In the Zscaler Digital Transformation Engineer material, Zscaler Deception is introduced as an advanced threat-detection capability that is tightly integrated with the Zero Trust Exchange. The official description emphasizes that it is a simple, cloud-delivered, and highly effective targeted threat detection solution built on Zscaler’s Zero Trust architecture, which is almost word-for-word reflected in option C.

Deception works by deploying high-fidelity decoys, lures, and credentials—designed to be indistinguishable from real assets—from the attacker’s point of view. Any interaction with these decoys is inherently suspicious, yielding high-confidence, low-noise alerts that help security teams quickly identify lateral movement, credential theft, and post-compromise activity. The key point in the training is that this capability is delivered from the Zscaler cloud, leveraging the existing Zero Trust platform; it does not require additional on-premise detection servers or traditional network-centric sensors.

Options A and B reduce the concept to “sets of decoys” and ignore the integrated Zero Trust detection value and cloud-native delivery model. Option D incorrectly suggests on-prem server infrastructure as the foundation. The exam materials clearly frame Zscaler Deception as a Zero Trust–based targeted threat detection solution, making option C the correct choice.

===========