DVA-C02 Exam Dumps - AWS Certified Developer - Associate

Because the developer cannot change the legacy application code, the solution must apply controls at the logging layer . CloudWatch Logs provides data protection policies that can automatically detect sensitive data using managed data identifiers (including credit card data) and apply masking (de-identification) as log events are ingested. This ensures that sensitive values such as card numbers and verification codes are not displayed in plaintext to general viewers of the log group.

With option A, enabling a data protection policy on the log group and configuring it to mask the relevant credit card data ensures that when support staff query or view logs, the sensitive fields appear redacted. CloudWatch Logs also supports controlled access to view the original unmasked values through an explicit permission: users who have the appropriate IAM authorization (such as logs:Unmask) can retrieve or view the sensitive data, while everyone else sees only the masked version. Granting logs:Unmask to application administrators satisfies the requirement that administrators can access the sensitive data, while withholding it from support staff enforces the restriction.

Option B (KMS encryption) provides encryption at rest for the log group but does not prevent authorized readers from seeing sensitive data once decrypted. Support staff who can read logs would still see plaintext card data. Option C is not a standard or operationally efficient pattern for CloudWatch Logs redaction; Macie is primarily for discovering sensitive data in S3 and does not serve as the native masking mechanism for CloudWatch Logs ingestion. Option D is not applicable: AWS WAF inspects HTTP requests/responses at the edge or load balancer/API layer, not application log streams already being emitted to CloudWatch.

Therefore, A is the correct solution: use CloudWatch Logs data protection to mask sensitive data by default and grant logs:Unmask only to administrators.

“Encryption in transit” for S3 means requiring requests to use HTTPS (TLS) rather than HTTP. AWS provides a standard policy condition key, aws:SecureTransport, that evaluates to true when the request is made over SSL/TLS and false when it is not. To enforce TLS for all cross-account GetObject requests, the most reliable control point is the S3 bucket resource-based policy, because the bucket is the resource being accessed and the bucket owner can enforce conditions regardless of which external account is calling.

Option A is the established pattern: add an explicit Deny statement in the bucket policy that denies all S3 actions (or at least s3:GetObject) when aws:SecureTransport is false. An explicit deny overrides any allows, ensuring that even if another account’s IAM policy allows access, the request will still be blocked if it is not using HTTPS.

Option B is backwards because it would allow insecure transport rather than deny it.

Option C is weaker because you cannot reliably enforce policies in other accounts (and principals could change roles or permissions). The bucket owner should enforce transport security at the bucket level.

Option D is not the right layer: the KMS key policy controls key usage, but the S3 GetObject transport requirement is best enforced by the S3 bucket policy. Also, S3 access can be denied before KMS is even involved.

Therefore, enforce HTTPS by adding a bucket policy Deny when aws:SecureTransport is false.

The correct answer is C because AWS AppConfig provides built-in support for feature flags , allowing developers to enable or disable features dynamically without redeploying application code. This is exactly what the question requires: keeping features hidden from end users until the features are ready for release, and then selectively activating them when appropriate.

AWS documentation describes AppConfig as a service for managing application configuration in a safe and controlled way. Feature flags in AppConfig let teams separate deployment from release , which is a core best practice in modern application development. A developer can deploy code that contains unfinished or hidden functionality, while the actual visibility and activation of that functionality is controlled through feature flag values stored in an AppConfig configuration profile. When the feature is ready, the flag can be turned on without changing the application package.

Option A is incorrect because AWS AppSync is a managed GraphQL service and is not the AWS feature flag service for application configuration management. Option B is incorrect because DynamoDB Streams are used for capturing item-level changes and reacting to table updates, not for controlled feature activation. Option D is incorrect because Amplify DataStore is intended for client-side data synchronization and offline access patterns, not centralized production feature flag management.

Using AppConfig also provides operational benefits such as deployment strategies, configuration validation, and rollback support, which make it safer than building a custom feature toggle mechanism. For these reasons, AWS AppConfig feature flags are the most appropriate and AWS-recommended solution for hiding prerelease features and selectively enabling them later.

Therefore, C is the correct answer.

Secrets Management: AWS Secrets Manager is designed specifically for storing and managing sensitive credentials.

Built-in Rotation: Secrets Manager provides automatic secret rotation functionality, enhancing security posture significantly.

IAM Integration: IAM policies and roles grant fine-grained access to ECS Fargate, ensuring the principle of least privilege.

Reduced Overhead: This solution centralizes secrets management and automates rotation, reducing operational overhead compared to the other options.

An SQS FIFO queue is a type of queue that preserves the order of messages and ensures that each message is delivered and processed only once1. This is suitable for the scenario where the developer wants to ensure that there are no out-of-order updates in the legacy system.

The visibility timeout value is the amount of time that a message is invisible in the queue after a consumer receives it2. This prevents other consumers from processing the same message simultaneously. If the consumer does not delete the message before the visibility timeout expires, the message becomes visible again and another consumer can receive it2.

In this scenario, the developer needs to configure the visibility timeout value to be longer than the maximum processing time of the legacy system, which is 5 minutes. This will ensure that the message remains invisible in the queue until the legacy system finishes processing it and deletes it. This will prevent duplicate or out-of-order processing of messages by the legacy system.

The requirement is for a single secret value to be available in multiple AWS Regions while remaining consistent across those Regions, with the least operational overhead . AWS Secrets Manager provides a managed capability for this use case: secret replication (also referred to as multi-Region secrets). When replication is enabled from a primary Region, Secrets Manager automatically creates and maintains synchronized replicas of the secret in the selected secondary Regions. Updates to the primary secret are propagated to the replicas so the secret value remains consistent across Regions.

This approach (option C) minimizes operational effort because AWS manages the replication workflow, consistency, and the lifecycle of replicas. The application in each Region can retrieve the secret from the local Region endpoint of Secrets Manager by referencing the Region-appropriate secret ARN, improving latency and reducing cross-Region dependency. It also improves resilience: if a Region has issues, workloads in another Region can still read the replicated secret locally.

Option A recreates managed replication with custom glue (Lambda + EventBridge), which adds code, scheduling, error handling, permissions, retries, and monitoring—higher operational overhead and more failure modes. Option B introduces a cross-Region runtime dependency on the primary Region and increases latency; local caching also risks stale secret values during rotations/updates unless carefully managed, and it reduces resilience if the primary Region is impaired. Option D (independent secrets per Region) increases operational overhead and directly risks inconsistency, because keeping values synchronized becomes a manual or custom automated process.

Therefore, C is the best solution: enable Secrets Manager replication in the primary Region and have applications in each Region read from their local replicated secret ARN to achieve consistent, multi-Region availability with minimal operational work.

This solution will meet the requirements by using Amazon RDS Proxy, which is a fully managed, highly available database proxy for Amazon RDS that makes applications more scalable, more resilient to database failures, and more secure. The developer can create a proxy in Amazon RDS Proxy, which sits between the application and the DB instance and handles connection management, pooling, and routing. The developer can query the proxy instead of the DB instance, which reduces the number of open connections to the DB instance and avoids errors for too many connections. Option A is not optimal because it will create a read replica for the DB instance, which may not solve the problem of too many connections as read replicas also have connection limits and may incur additional costs. Option B is not optimal because it will migrate the data to an Amazon DynamoDB database, which may introduce additional complexity and overhead for migrating and accessing data from a different database service. Option C is not optimal because it will configure the Amazon Aurora MySQL DB instance for Multi-AZ deployment, which may improve availability and durability of the DB instance but not reduce the number of connections.