312-49v11 Exam Dumps - Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator (CHFIv11)

According to theCHFI v11 Computer Forensics FundamentalsandFile Analysismodules, ahex editoris a critical forensic tool used to view and analyze raw disk data at the byte level. Hex editors typically present data in three main columns or areas: theaddress (offset) area, thehexadecimal area, and thecharacter (ASCII) area.

Thecharacter areadisplays theASCII interpretation of each byteshown in the hexadecimal area. This allows investigators to visually identifyreadable text strings, file headers, metadata, embedded scripts, usernames, URLs, file signatures, and fragments of deleted files that may still reside in unallocated space or slack space. Printable characters are shown as readable text, while non-printable bytes are usually represented by dots (.).

Theaddress areashows the offset or location of the data within the file or disk. Thehexadecimal areadisplays the raw byte values in hexadecimal format, which is essential for precise byte-level analysis. Afooter areais not a standard component of hex editor layouts as defined in CHFI v11.

CHFI v11 emphasizes correlating thehexadecimal values with their ASCII representationsto accurately interpret raw data and identify meaningful forensic artifacts. Therefore, the area that displays the ASCII representation of each byte is theCharacter area, makingOption Dthe correct and CHFI v11–verified answer.

Within the CHFI v11 syllabus underOperating System ForensicsandImage/Evidence Examination and Event Correlation, timeline reconstruction is a core forensic technique used to understandwhat happened, when it happened, and in what order. When analyzing NTFS file systems, investigators rely heavily onMAC times—Modified, Accessed, and Createdtimestamps—to establish file activity.

The Sleuth Kit toolsflsandmactimeare specifically designed for this purpose. Theflstool extracts file and directory metadata from a forensic image, whilemactimeprocesses this metadata to generate a chronological timeline of file system events. This timeline typically includesfile creation time, last modification time, and last access time, allowing investigators to correlate file activity with known incident times, user actions, or attacker behavior.

Option B describes low-level file system analysis, which is useful in other contexts but is not the primary focus ofmactime. Option C relates to system-level operational timelines rather than file activity. Option D focuses on Windows event logs, which are valuable for corroboration but are separate from NTFS file system timestamp analysis.

The CHFI v11 Exam Blueprint explicitly highlightsfile system timeline creation and analysis using The Sleuth Kit, emphasizing MAC timestamps as the foundational data used to reconstruct sequences of events during digital investigations

According to theCHFI v11 Mobile and IoT Forensicsdomain,rooting an Android deviceis the most common and direct method used to obtainelevated (superuser) privilegesand unrestricted access to system resources. Rooting allows a user to bypass Android’s built-in security restrictions and gain full control over the operating system, including access to protected directories, system binaries, kernel parameters, and hardware interfaces.

CHFI v11 explains that once an Android device is rooted, the user can modify system files, install unauthorized applications, disable security controls, manipulate logs, and conceal malicious activity—making rooting a frequent technique in cybercrime and anti-forensics scenarios. From a forensic perspective, rooting significantly impacts evidence integrity and is often identified through artifacts such as the presence of su binaries, modified boot images, or root management applications.

Whileinstalling a custom ROMdoes modify the operating system, it does not inherently guarantee unrestricted system access unless the device is rooted.Jailbreakingapplies specifically to iOS devices, not Android. Exploiting an iOS firmware vulnerability may lead to jailbreaking, but the scenario does not indicate an iOS environment.

CHFI v11 emphasizes that identifying whether a device has beenrootedis critical during mobile investigations, as it affectsdata acquisition methods, trustworthiness of artifacts, and anti-forensic risk assessment.

Therefore, the most likely method used to achieve elevated privileges and unrestricted system access in this scenario isrooting the Android device, makingOption Cthe correct answer.

This question aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underRegulations, Policies, and EthicsandSearch and Seizure of Digital Evidence. Before any forensic examination can legally take place—especially an on-site examination involving computers and email servers—the investigator must obtainproper legal authorization. In practice, this authorization is enforced through the lawfulseizure of systems and accounts, either via a search warrant, court order, or explicit consent from the system owner.

CHFI v11 emphasizes that digital forensic investigations must strictly follow legal procedures to ensure evidence admissibility and avoid violations of privacy or due process. Seizing the computer systems and email accounts establishes lawful control over the evidence, enables proper chain of custody documentation, and prevents further tampering or destruction of data. Only after seizure and authorization can investigators safely proceed with technical tasks such as retrieving email headers, recovering deleted messages, or analyzing email content.

The other options describe forensic analysis steps that occurafterlegal access has been granted. Performing them without authorization could invalidate evidence and expose the investigator to legal liability. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 best practices and legal requirements,seizing the computer and email accountsis the correct initial step before proceeding with the forensic examination.

This scenario aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underMobile and IoT ForensicsandCross-Platform Digital Evidence Correlation. Modern cyberattacks frequently involve multiple devices and operating systems working together as part of a single attack chain. In mobile forensic investigations, Android and iOS devices often store artifacts that reflect interactions with external systems such as Windows and Linux machines. These artifacts may include USB connection logs, file transfer records, SSH keys, shared application data, cloud sync traces, or remnants of malware propagation.

CHFI v11 emphasizes the importance ofevent correlation and timeline analysisacross heterogeneous environments. By analyzing Windows- and Linux-related files found on a mobile device, investigators can establish relationships between compromised endpoints, reconstruct attacker movement, and identify how data or malware was transferred between systems. This cross-device correlation is essential for attributing actions, understanding lateral movement, and proving coordinated activity during an incident.

The other options focus on device identification details, which are typically obtained through mobile hardware and OS artifacts, not through external system files. Therefore, the correct forensic purpose is to establish connections between multiple devices involved in the cyberattack, making option C the correct and CHFI-aligned answer.

In CHFI v11,memory dump analysisfocuses on identifyingvolatile artifacts, such as running processes, loaded modules, decrypted data, network connections, and application-specific memory remnants. The availability of Tor Browser artifacts in memory is highly dependent on theexecution and installation stateof the Tor Browser at the time of acquisition.

When theTor Browser is opened, it generates the highest number of artifacts in memory. These include active Tor processes, circuit information, encryption keys, temporary buffers, and cached session data. Even when theTor Browser is closed but still installed, some residual artifacts may remain in memory or be partially recoverable due to delayed memory reuse, along with indirect indicators such as prefetch references and previously allocated memory pages.

However, when theTor Browser is uninstalled, there are no active Tor-related processes or associated memory segments loaded into RAM. As explicitly covered in the CHFI v11 blueprint underTor Browser ForensicsandForensic Analysis: Tor Browser Uninstalled, uninstalling Tor significantly reduces both volatile and non-volatile artifacts. Consequently, memory dumps acquired after uninstallation contain theleast possible number of recoverable Tor artifacts, often limited to overwritten or non-attributable memory fragments.

Therefore, based strictly on CHFI v11 objectives and forensic principles,Tor browser uninstalled (Option B)is the correct answer.

This question aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underData Acquisition and Duplication, specificallyimage validation and forensic integrity verification. After acquiring a forensic image, it is a mandatory best practice to verify that the image is an exact bit-for-bit replica of the original evidence source. CHFI v11 stresses thatverification protects evidence integrity and supports legal admissibilityby proving that no data was altered during acquisition.

Thedcflddtool—an enhanced version of the Unix dd utility—supports forensic features such as hashing, logging, splitting, andimage verification. The vf (verify file) parameter in the command

dcfldd if=/dev/sda vf=image.dd

directly compares the original input device (/dev/sda) with the previously created image file (image.dd). This ensures that both sources match exactly, sector by sector.

Option B performs imaging with hashing but does not verify an existing image against the original drive. Option C simply creates an image without validation, and Option D uses dd with file splitting, which lacks forensic verification features. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 acquisition validation standards,Option Ais the correct command to verify the forensic image against the original medium.

This question aligns with CHFI v11 objectives underComputer Forensics FundamentalsandDigital Evidence and Storage Media. In forensic investigations involving servers suspected of hosting illicit content, investigators must focus on storage locations that reliably preserve data over time. CHFI v11 emphasizes thatnon-volatile storage—such as hard disk drives (HDDs), solid-state drives (SSDs), RAID arrays, and other persistent storage media—is the primary repository for user files, documents, system files, logs, and file system metadata.

Non-volatile storage retains data even when the system is powered off, making it essential for post-incident forensic analysis. This includes directory structures, timestamps, access control lists, deleted file remnants, and application data, all of which are critical for reconstructing user activity and determining the presence and origin of illicit content.

Volatile memory (RAM) contains temporary data such as running processes and network connections, which is useful during live analysis but does not store long-term user files. External backups and network storage may contain copies of data but are secondary sources and may not reflect the system’s current state. Therefore, consistent with CHFI v11 forensic principles, the investigator should primarily focus onnon-volatile storage, as it is the most reliable and comprehensive source of persistent digital evidence.